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Abstract
We introduce a model, based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, for studying the dynamics
of group formation. The latter constitutes a relevant phenomenon observed in different animal
species, whose individuals tend to cluster together forming groups of different size. Results of
previous investigations suggest that this phenomenon might have similar reasons across different
species, such as improving the individual safety (e.g. from predators), and increasing the probability
to get food resources. Remarkably, the group size might strongly vary from species to species, and
sometimes even within the same species. In the proposed model, an agent population tries to
form homogeneous groups. The homogeneity of a group is computed according to a spin vector,
that characterizes each agent, and represents a set a features (e.g. physical traits). We analyze
the formation of groups of different size, on varying a parameter named ’individual payoff’. The
latter represents the gain one agent would receive acting individually. In particular, the agents
choose whether to form a group (receiving a ’group payoff’), or if to play individually (receiving
an ’individual payoff’). The phase diagram representing the equilibria of our population shows a
sharp transition between the ’group phase’ and the ’individual phase’, in correspondence of a critical
’individual payoff’. In addition, we found that forming (homogeneous) small groups is easier than
forming big groups. To conclude, we deem that our model and the related results supports the
hypothesis that the phenomenon of group formation has evolutionary roots.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of group formation constitutes a topic of interest for a wide number of
researchers, spanning from anthropologists to zoologists [1–7], and from social psychologists
to economists [8–13]. In general, the formation of a group can be viewed as an emergent
phenomenon [10, 14] where a number of individuals cluster together for performing one
or more actions. Accordingly, the lifespan (as well as other characteristics) of a group
can vary from case to case, and individuals can change group over time [15–17]. In an
ecological system, many times being part of a group allows to receive benefits [16], both
being a predator and being a prey. For instance, the former can be advantaged during a
hunt, e.g. surrounding a prey, while the latter can improve her/his safety staying inside a
group [18]. Here, we remark that the previous example, referring to predators and preys,
can be considered outdated in the case of the human species. However, we should remind
that millions of years ago, and maybe even in more recent times, humans have played both
roles in their ecosystem. Different studies suggest that the formation of social groups has
evolutionary roots [1, 19–24], shared among animals belonging to different species. For
instance, we can observe groups of fishes (generally named as shoals), of mammalians (named
herds or families/tribes in the case of humans), and of birds (named flocks) [20].
What differs, from species to species, is the average size of a group [25–29], e.g. shoals are
usually much bigger than herds, herds are bigger than families, and so on and so forth. In
addition, even within the same species, groups of different size can be observed —see Figure 1.
The formation of groups is a phenomenon of interest also beyond the domain of evolutionary
biology, as we can mention the formation of sport teams, of business organizations [11], and
of scientific communities. Even if the motivations that lead to the formation of this kind of
groups can be quite different from those that trigger the emergence of groups in nature, in
both cases individuals cluster together driven by a rational mindset, i.e. aimed to increase
their wealth. Therefore, we think that the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT
hereinafter)[30–43] can be a suitable choice for studying this phenomenon, since it embodies
both the rationality and the evolutionary aspect of group formation [44, 45]. When studying
the dynamics of group formation, it is important to evaluate the role of similarity. In
particular, the heterogeneity of a group can be an advantage, or a disadvantage, depending
on the context of reference. Indeed, heterogeneity might refers to different aspects, as physical
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FIG. 1. Pictorial representation of different animal groups in nature, from the single snake to the
shoal of fishes, indicating that the group size does not seem related only to the evolution but also
to other factors (to be uncovered). One of the aim of this image is to emphasize that within the
same species, as for humans, the average group size may vary according to the living environment
and to other conditions (e.g., socio-cultural habits, religious beliefs, and so on).
traits, genetic makeup, or skills. Previous studies (e.g. [46]) reported that social networks
show a positive value of assortativity [47], i.e. it seems individuals be more likely to generate
links with their own similar, while other kinds of complex networks [48] are more likely to
be disassortative (according to an entropic principle [46]). Thus, in the proposed model,
we consider an agent population that forms and breaks groups over time, according to
the gain agents receive acting in group or individually. The agent’s gain comes from the
difference between benefits and costs, in taking a particular action (i.e. group or individual).
The gain achieved in group is defined as ’group payoff’, while that achieved singularly is
defined ’individual payoff’. According to results reported in [46], here the ’group payoff’ is
maximized for homogeneous groups. Results of numerical simulations indicate that for each
group size G, there is a critical ’individual payoff’ between a ’group phase’ and an ’individual
phase’ of the population, i.e. the formation of groups or the individual action. In addition,
forming groups of big size is more difficult than forming small groups. To conclude, in our
view, the achieved results support the hypothesis of an evolutionary mechanism underlying
the formation of groups in nature. Notably, we speculate that each animal species has its
’individual payoff’, i.e. a kind of gain its individuals receive when they act as single members,
and that this parameter might depend also on the considered environment. In addition, in
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the case of human beings, we suppose that the ’individual payoff’ might be related also
to socio-cultural conditions, leading to the formation of very small groups in the modern
civilization, and to the formation of bigger groups (i.e. tribes) in more archaic systems
(see [49–51]). Notably, two important differences between the modern civilization and the
archaic ones are the living environment and the cultural structure (e.g. relations, laws, etc)
of a society, both making a city more suitable than a forest for individual life styles. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the proposed model.
Section III shows the results of numerical simulations. Eventually, Section IV provides an
interpretation of the achieved results, and ends the paper.
II. THE MODEL
In the proposed model, we consider a population with N agents that can cluster together
forming groups of size G. Each agent is represented by a spin vector S, of length L, e.g. for
L = 6 the i-th agent can be represented as Si = [+1,−1,−1,−1,+1,+1]. Here, each entry
of the spin vector can be viewed as a feature, so the homogeneity of a group is measured
considering the distance between spin vectors of its members. It is worth to note that we
refer to the concept of feature with its more general meaning, since it may vary from species
to species. For instance, for many animals (including humans) a feature can be a physical
trait, and in the case of humans it can represent also a hobby, or a specific skill, and so on
(i.e. not only physical features). The dynamics of the proposed model is very simple. At
each time step a number G of agents, not belonging to any group, is randomly selected. So,
selected agents compute the potential payoff they could gain acting together (depending on
the homogeneity of the potential group). In particular, the ’group payoff’ pig decreases when
members have different spin vectors. Then, the value of pig is compared to that of pii, i.e.
the payoff that agents would gain acting individually. In doing so, pii and pig are used to
compute the probability of forming a group of size G, with the selected agents, which reads
W (G) =
(
1 + exp
[
pig − pii
K
])−1
(1)
where the constant K parametrizes the uncertainty in taking a decision (i.e. to form, or not,
the group). By using K = 0.5, we implement a rational approach [33, 52]. After processing
a new potential group, the model evaluates if a previous one, randomly selected among
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those formed at previous time steps, might be broken. The breaking process is performed
according to the same equation adopted to generate a group (i.e. Eq. 1). As mentioned
before, the homogeneity of a group is computed according to the spin vector of its members.
Accordingly, the group payoff pig is defined as length of the normalized average summation
of each spin vector (composing the considered group). In particular, since each entry can be
positive (i.e. +1) or negative (i.e. −1), after computing the average value of a single spin
we take its absolute value. So, given spin vectors of length L, the ’group payoff’ for a group
of size G reads
pig =
1
L
1
G
L∑
j=1
|
G∑
i=1
vij| (2)
with vi elements of the spin vector of each agent. Eventually, it is worth noting that the
range of pig is [0,+1], while that of the ’individual payoff’ pii spans the interval [−1,+1]. In
doing so, we represent scenarios where acting individually can be very risky (i.e. pii = −1),
and very convenient (i.e. pii = +1). At the same time, we assume that acting in group
cannot never lead to a negative payoff. Finally, we remark that during each simulation, the
value of pii remains constant. Summarizing, the proposed model can be described as follows:
1. At t = 0 generate a population providing each agent with a random spin array;
2. While the number of time step is smaller than T :
3. Randomly select G agents, not belonging to other groups;
4. Compute the probability the selected agents form a new group;
5. Randomly select a group among those previously formed, and compute the prob-
ability to break it;
Since we consider an asynchronous dynamics, i.e. only a subset of agents plays at a given
time step, the value of T must be big enough in relation to the population size.
III. RESULTS
Numerical simulations have been performed in a population with N = 1000 agents, con-
sidering different conditions related to the ’group payoff’ and to the ’individual payoff’, i.e.
pii in the range [−1,+1], and pig in the range [0,+1]. In addition, we study the dynamics of
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the population for different length of the spin vector characterizing our agents. Due to the
value of N , we analyzed the emergence of groups of the following size: [2, 4, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100].
Figure 2 shows the phase diagram of our population. Figure 3 indicates the density of the
FIG. 2. Phase diagram of the population, group size G versus the ’individual payoff’ pii, on varying
the length of the spin vector L. Yellow indicates the ’group phase’, while Blue the ’individual
phase’. a L = 3 and b L = 10. Results have been averaged over different simulation runs.
groups in function of the ’individual payoff’, on varying the length of the spin vector L. It
FIG. 3. Density of groups ρg in function of the ’individual payoff’ pii, on varying the length of the
spin vector L: a L = 3. bL = 10. c L = 25. Results have been averaged over different simulation
runs.
is then possible to find the critical thresholds pii, on varying the group size G. For instance,
in the case L = 3, we observe pii = 0.55 for G = 2, pii = 0.15 for G = 10, and pii = 0.05
for G = 25. It is then worth to evaluate if the length L (i.e. the length of the spin vector)
affects the outcomes of the model —see Figure 4. In particular, one can observe that L does
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FIG. 4. Density of groups ρg in function of the ’individual payoff’ pii, for different vector spin length
L, on varying the group size G. a) G = 2. b) G = 10. c) G = 25. d) G = 50. Results have been
averaged over different simulation runs.
not influence the density of groups at equilibrium. Eventually, as reported in Figure 5, we
analyze the number of breaking groups (B(t)) over time. In particular, we consider different
group sizes G, and spin vector lengths L, on varying the individual payoff.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the phenomenon of group formation using the framework of EGT.
In particular, we introduce a simple model where agents evaluate if clustering together, or
acting individually, according to a payoff they may receive if acting in group (named ’group
payoff’), or individually (named ’individual payoff’). Under the assumption that the ’group
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FIG. 5. Breaking groups over time (i.e. B(t)). The legend indicates, for each line, the considered
group size G. a) Results achieved with L = 3. b) Results achieved with L = 25. c) Comparison
between results achieved with L = 3 and L = 25. Results have been averaged over different
simulation runs.
payoff’ increases while increasing the homogeneity of a group, we study the formation and
the breaking of groups. Even if further investigations would be required in order to evaluate
the outcomes on varying the definition of the ’group payoff’, we suppose that the achieved
results can be considered general enough for envisioning some interesting speculation related
to the evolutionary aspects of group formation in nature. Notably, observing that groups
form in species ranging from ants to birds, and from lions to human beings, we support the
hypothesis that this process has evolutionary roots [6, 20]. In addition, we suggest that the
’individual payoff’ is a relevant parameter representing the ensemble of genetic traits, skills,
living environments, and even socio-cultural conditions one can observe in real systems.
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For instance, we hypothesize that being part of a group is more advantageous in a hostile
environment than in a relaxed one, as suggested by some theories related to the formation of
shoals of fishes. So, even considering the same species, we can have individuals acting in very
small groups and others in big groups. For example, in the modern civilization [49, 51], small
groups named families are, nowadays, composed of very few members, while tribes living in
wilder environments are more copious. We deem relevant to emphasize that the proposed
model suggests the existence of a critical threshold in the ’individual payoff’, leading to a
sharp transition in the phase diagram (see Figure 2), from a ’group phase’ achieved for low
values of pii to an ’individual phase’ achieved for high values of pig. Notably, for high values of
the critical pii the group formation is scarcely observed. Here, ’group phase’ and ’individual
phase’ correspond to the two states our population can achieve at equilibrium, i.e. with
agents forming groups or acting individually. Finally, results reported in figure 5 confirm
previous findings and provide a further detail. In particular, analyzing the average number
of breaking groups B(t), we observe that small groups are more robust than big ones, and
the maximum number of breaking groups is in correspondence with the critical threshold
pˆii. Furthermore, for very high ’individual payoffs’ big groups are more robust than small
ones (i.e. the opposite of the case with low pii). To conclude, we highlight that the proposed
model represents an application of EGT besides its classical domain, providing results that
remarkably corroborate the hypothesis that the emergence of groups in animal species has
evolutionary roots.
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